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MAKING PARENTS:
CONVENTIONS, INTENTIONS,
AND BIOLOGICAL CONNECTIONS
YVETTE PEARSON

Weaving a Tangled Web?
First, I will explore apparent inconsistencies sWTounding th.e importance
attached to intentions and genetic connections in determining who has
parental rights or obligations and how attitudes regar<Jng the relative
importance of these elements have influenced various conventions/social
practices. Both intentions and genetic connections carry significant weight
to the extent that taking them into account serves the interests of those
who are either attempting to procreate or have succeeded. In some cases
intentions carry more weight than genetic connections, and vice versa. I
will also discuss another relevant biological connection-the
gestational
connection between women and offspring-but it is worth noting that this
has almost al ways been viewed (and valued) to the extenl that it indicates
a genetic connection with the child. Regardless of whether primacy is
given to intentions or biological connections, especially genetic
connections, the main focus is on the desires of lhose attempting to
procreate rather than the ability of prospective parents to fulfill obligations
toward offspring. Instead of focusing on likely impact of emphasizing one
or the other on the welfare of offspring, whether intentions or genetic
connections are regarded as significant is usually determined by the goals
or desires of the procreators.

Intention
Though many people spend a fair amount of time and money trying to
avoid procreation, some people do intend to procreate. And in many cases
they succeed. However, when sexual interaction does not or cannot result
in progeny, creating or acquiring children requires intentional acts aimed
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specifically at bringing children into the world or into the home of those
who wish to rear them. Aside from these circumstances, however, the
relationship between intention and procreation can be difficult to establish.
There may be no identifiable intentions at all-either to procreate or to
avoid it--or the precise content of the intention might be difficult to
determine. Even when intentions are clearly stated (e.g., in surrogacy
agreements or gamete vendor consent forms) or when they are implied by
the mere act of going to a fertility clinic and asking for assistance, it
remains unclear what weight those intentions should carry. Even if a clear
intention regarding procreation can be identified, ii can still be challenging
to figure out whether intentions have changed over time or which
intentions actually "count". It is possible that a person might intend at Tl
to procreate and rear a child bot intend otherwise at TI. Intentions don't
have expiration dates attached to them. It is unclear, for example, whether
the intention at Tl should take precedence over that at TI or vice versa, or
the extent to which the context in which either intention is formed ought to
be considered morally relevant.
In the absence. of explicit contracts, which are rarely present in the
context of procreation, it can be difficult to determine a person's intentions
with respect to procreation. Furthermore, even if there is something as
clear as a written document or some other evidence of the person's
intentions (e.g., embryos created with gametes that the person had
voluntarily left at a fertility clinic), there remains the possibility that her
intentions may be altered by various factors. For example, a couple may
agree to use their gametes to create fertilized eggs via IVF with the initial
intention of transferring them to the woman's uterus but decide later that
they do not want to attempt to create a child in this manner. Chan and
Quigley have argued for the contentious claim that once a person has
agreed to "engage in IVF for purposes of having a child ... [he/she] has
ceded any right. .. not to become a genetic [parent] of the child that the
embryo would become." 1 This means that once this first step has been
taken, neither party should be permitted to stop the other from moving
forward and transferring the fertilized egg in an attempt to create a child.
But this is problematic, insofar as it assumes the irreversibility of an
intention to procreate and suggests that merely willing to create, bear, and
rear a child carries with it the same obligations as following through with
these actions. There is no turning back after that point; one is held
accountable for intending to bring into existence a child to whom one
1

Sarah Chan and Muireann Quigley, "Frozen Embryos, GeneticInformation, and
Reproductive Rights," Bioethics 22, no. 8 (2007): 447.
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would have moral obligations. The problem with Chan and Quigley's
position is an apparent failure to distinguish carefully between rights and
obligations toward children and those we might have coward zygotes or
early embryos. Moreover, if we consider more typical cases where people
intend to procreate, this view proves to have problematic implications. For
example, consider the case of a couple expressing an intention to
procreate, attempting Lo do so via intercourse, but ultimately failing to
achieve pregnancy or losing the pregnancy due to miscarriage. The couple
may subsequently decide to wait for months or years before attempting to
procreate, or they might decide against becoming parents. Chan and
Quigley's view suggests l11arthe couple should follow through with their
original intention despite their reasons for having changed their minds,
given their view that one's intention to procreate, expressed by creating
IVF embryos or agreeing with one's partner to do so, is irrevocable.
Despite the presence of explicit agreements in contexts in which third
parties are involved in the procreative process, such as gestational
surrogates or gamete vendors, questions arise about the moral relevance
and relative weight- of the intentions of the various -parties involved.
Although people often follow 11:troughwith their first intentions, there have
been some well-publici_zed cases of surrogate mothers or "intended
parents" changing their minds either during the pregnancy or once the
child is born. Additionally, there are gamete donors/vendors who desire to
connect with their progeny or come to regret their previous decision.
Likewise, some children created using donor/vendor gametes develop a
desire to find lheir genetic parents. Such problems arise despite the
seemingly clear beginnings of certain types of procreative endeavors, so it
is little wonder that things remain unclear in cases where procreation is not
well thought out.
One of the most flagrant mixed messages related to the relevance of
intention in the procreative process involves the clear intention on the part
of a gamete vendor/donor that his/her gametes be used in attempts to
create children. While there are no guarantees that their gametes will lead
to the creation of a take-home baby, the in.tention on the part of the gamete
vendor is clear. In such cases, however, the gamete vendor. who
participates (intentionally) in procreation this way, is llOl held accountable
for the resultant offspring. Intent to procreate in this manner does not
entail in our society an obligation to rear the offspring. In fact the vendor
consent forms usually state explicitly that the vendors have neither rights
nor responsibilities toward the offspring. More problematically, and unlike
cases of adoption, the vendors in the U.S. are not given any kind of
assurance that their progeny will be properly cared for and are given no
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,oeans of following up to make sure. This purely contractual view of
has struck some as a strange arrangement. For
example, Daniel Callahan made the following observation regarding the
practice of anonymous sperm donation: "It is as if everyone argued: Look
wales have always been fathering children
anonymously
and
2
irfesponsibly; why not put this otherwise noxious trait to good use?"
Juxtaposed to this state of affairs is the social convention that the
creation of a child when there. is no intention to do so, or perhaps even a
clear intention to avoid doing so, may entail obligations toward the child.
for example, if a sexual interlude between two virtual strangers results in
a child, the biological father of the child is often required to provide
financial support. He cannot be compelled to participate otherwise in the
child's upbringing, but he is held accountable lo some degree regardless of
whether he intended to procreate. For obvious reasons, e.g., self-interest oc
feeling betrayed by the child's mother, several nonvoluntary/involuntary
fathers disagree with the notion that they ought to be held accountable for
their progeny. And while the view of the involuntary father is more often
backed by emotion, e.g., feelings of resentment rather than principled
opposition to supporting offspring created unintentionally, others have
argued that the practice of forcing men to pay child support is morally
suspect For example, Brake,3 Fuscaldo,4 and Weinberg/ among others,
have questioned the implicit assumption that being causally responsible
for the existence of a child entruls moral responsibility. 6 Brake argues that
while a man may be obligated to "share certain costs immediately incurred
as a result of sex, his responsibility comes lo an end when [the woman]
gives birth." 7 She argues that the obligation is owed to the woman not the
resultant child. However, this seems to rest on a confusion about to whom
obligations are owed. Arguably, neither men nor women are obligated to
embryos qua embryos (e.g., there is no obligation to bring all embryos to
term), but we do have obligations toward children. Thus, I agree with
Weinberg's assertion that we are responsible for what happens to gametes
that develop into beings with moral status if we choose to take risks with

parental obligation

1

Daniel Callahan, "Bioethics and Fatherhood, Utah law Review 3 (1992): 74 l.
Elizabeth Brake. "Fatherhood and Child Support: Do Men Have a Right to
Choose?"Journal of Applied Philosophy 22. no. 1 (2005): SS-73.
4
Guiliana Fuscaldo, "Genetic Ties: Ar.eThey Morally Binding? Bioethics 20, no. 2
(2006): 64-76.
5
Rivka Weinberg, '"The Moral Complexity of Sperm Donation,'' Bioethics 22. no.
3

3 (2008): 166-78.
6
7

Brake, "Fatherhood and Child Support, 61.
Brake, "Fatherhood and Child Support," 63.
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our gametes qua hazardous materials. 8 Though obligations toward children
can later be transferred through various mechanjsms, e.g., adoption, the
fact that transfer is required implies that the person doing the transferring
possesses the obligations (or rights) that they are transferring. This view
does not require that we subscribe to the view that parenthood is grounded
solely in genetics; instead, the relevant feature js that the creation of a
child was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of our actions.
In today's world, a gamete vendor who claims that he/she never
intended to help rear the children that result from the use of his/her
gametes is off the hook, and can probably point to a consent form or
agreement that says just that. On the other hand, a man who finds out that
he has inadvertently contributed to the existence of a yhild but claims that
he never intended to either create a child or rear one will find his request
to bow out of parental responsibility readily rejected. Hence, in
contemporary society, intended procreation need not come with social
enforcement of obligations, while unintended procreation usually does.
This state of affairs is just one indication of our wildly inconsistent
attitudes toward the relative importance of the presence (or absence) of
procreative intentions.
Even though the intention of an involuntary father-i.e., to avoid
procreation-is distinct from that of the gamete donor who does intend to
procreate, there is no distinction in these cases in terms of reasonable
foreseeability. So, even if either the gamete donor or the participant in the
one night stand claims to be surprised by the outcome or retracts what
seemed to be th.e obvious intention at the time of the action in questioni.e., the gamete sale or sexual interaction--that this was a reasonably
foreseeable outcome of presumably voluntary actions is not a matter of
dispute. Any informed, rational evaluator given the facts of either case
would concede that the creation of a child was a reasonably foreseeable
outcome in either case.

Conventions/Biological Connections
Genetic connections
Without providing an exhaustive list of conventions that have shaped
our views of parenthood and corresponding social and legal practices, I
want to point to a few that seem to have had a significant impact One
thread that runs through many prevailing conventions is the emphasis on
8

Weinberg, "Moral Complexity of Sperm Donation," 171.
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!!t!)]etic connections between parents and offspring, as captured in the
;aying "blood is thicker than water''. The idea is that genetic connections
trUffiPother kinds of relationships among people. One consequence of this
is that becoming a parent through traditional adoption arrangements is
viewed as a last resort-something
one does only if they are infertile and
unsuccessful with attempts to circumvent their fertility problems. Another
consequence of this emphasis on the importance of genetic connections is
that in many legal disputes genetic connections have often carried greater
weight in determining custody and child support than other factors, such as
(a) an established social relationship between a -child and a particular
adult; (b) a gestational connection between a woman (genetically related
or not) and a newborn; or (c) the intentions of genetically unrelated adults
to rear the offspring.
In the previous section I discussed the convention that requires men to
provide economic support to genetically related children who were created
through voluntary sexual intercourse that led to the child's existence. Here,
however, I will elaborate on the associated practice of using DNA testing
to absolve one of responsibility toward children. As Barthol et puts it, men
claim that "if a DNA match alone can be used to force [men] into
parenthood, then the absence of a DNA match should enable them to
9
escape parenthood." In some cases men are relieved of legal obligations
toward children with wliom they have no genetic connection, despite their
having been the only father a child has known for its entire life. For
example, in Doran v. Doran (2003), a man who had been rearing a child
for 10 years was granted permission by the Pennsylvania Superior Court to
0
remove himself entirely from the child's life! Regardless of whether a
man is genetically connected to the child, a decision can be made at an
early stage by the man. that he would participate in rearing the child{ren).
The ability to rescind this decision once a relationship has been established
with child(ren) over the course of a year or more, regardless of the
presence or absence of a genetic connection, is to neglect the interests of
both the child and the man in continuing the relationship. If a man makes a
clear decision to help rear particular children, he should not walk away
from that commitment, even if it turns out that he is not genetically
connected to the children. If we reject the idea that gamete vendors should
be permitted to participate in the lives of their progeny because allowing it
9

Elizabeth Bartbolet, "Guiding Principles for Pie.ling Parents," in Genetic Ties
and the Family, ed Marth A. Rotbstein, Thomas H. Murray. Gregory Kaebnick,
and Mary Anderlik Majumder (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005),
146.
10

Bartholel, "Guiding Principles,'· 133.
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would disrupt children's lives, we should also acknowledge that permitting
a father to dissolve an established parent-child relationship is likely to be
at le.ast as disruptive and injurious to both the child and the father as the
introduction of an additional family member.
In the preceding discussion about the confusion surrounding the
significance of intentions, I discussed the relatively recent convention that
stipulates that individuals who donate or sell their gametes to fertility
clinics for the purpose of assisting others in procreation have no
obligations or rights toward progeny created via assisted reproductive
technology (AR1). The genetic connection between gamete vendors or
donors and their progeny is trumped by the intentions and desires of those
who seek assistance in procreation. This is not to suggest that the gamete
donors/vendors find this problematic (in most cases); instead, the point is
that although the genetic connection has most frequently been the trump
card, there is this exception to that general rule.
The use of donor/vendor gametes is aimed primarily at ensuring that at
least one member of the infertile couple wilJ have a genetic connection to
the offspring, presumably because genetic connections between parents
and children are highly valued. However, as Bartholct points out the use of
donor/vendor gametes amounts to disregarding the child's "need for
generational continuity [by which she means a connection to forebears or
descendants] while at the same time asserting their own." 11 Andrews also
notes that it is a peculiar state of affairs when many divorced fathers are
doing genetic tests to determine whether they are "really" fathers to their
children while men whose wives use "donor" sperm consider themselves
fathers of the resultant offspring. 12 These practices illustrate an
inconsistent attitude toward genetic connections-they are treated as both
important and unimportant at once.
Additionally, the fact that the child's genetic origins are often a closely
guarded secret, even to the child, suggests an even more mysterious state
of affairs wherein the appearanceof genetic connections rather than actual
genetic connections is desired. Granted, the creation of genetically related
children is the primary goal of most attempts to procreate via assisted
reproductive technology, but once it is estabHshed that this goal is not
achievable, except in cases where attempts to adopt a child have failed, it
is unclear why the prospective parents would opt to create a child that
11

Bartholet, Family Bonds, 228.
Lori B. Andrews, "Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Challenge for
Paternity Laws," in Genetic Ties and the Family, ed. Marth A Rothstein. Thomas
H. Murray, Gregory Kaebnick. and Mary Anderlik Majumder (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2005), 187-88.
12
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Jacks a genetic connection to them rather than adopt an existing child who
would have no less of a genetic connection to them.

Gestational connections
While the main biological connection of interest has been the genetic
connection between fathers and offspring, the separation of gestational
connections from genetics or intent to rear raises additional questions
about who counts as the "real" parent Surrogates have been around for
centuries, but the traditional way of becoming a -surrogate was through
insemination with the intended father's sperm. In today's world, however,
a donor/vendor egg may be used by either a gestational surrogate or the
intended mother. Hence, while the fact of giving birth used to be evidence
of a woman's genetic connection to a child. this is no longer necessarily
so. Moreover, even when the gestational and genetic connections to the
child are both found in the same woman, disputes have arisen about
whether these ties trump pre-conception intentions lo transfer parental
rights to, e.g., the genetic father and his partner, once the child is born.
Probably the most infamous case was the 1988 Baby M case, where the
first court ruled that the intended father, Mr. Stem, and his wife were the
child's legal parents and that Ms. Whitehead, the surrogate-the genetic
and gestational mother-had no legal claim to the child due to her preconception agreement with the Stems. In this case, the genetic connection
between Mr. Stern and the child, coupled with his and Ms. Stem's
intention to rear the child, took precedence over the genetic and gestational
connections between the child and Ms. Whitehead. This initial ruling,
which was a first move toward allowing intentions to carry greater weight,
was eventually overturned and Ms. Whitehead was given visitation rights.
In a 1993 case, Johnson v. Calvert. Ms. Johnson agreed with the Calverts
to gestate an embryo created with the Calverts' gametes and relinquish the
child at birth. Ms. Johnson, who claimed to have bonded with the child
during gestation, sued for custody. The court ruled in favor of honoring the
initial intentions of the parties but also appealed to the significance of
genetic connections between the Calverts and the child in the decision. It
was not until the 1998 Buzzanca case that we see intent to rear as the sole
basis for deciding legal parentage, but since then intentio11has continued
to play a significant role in some decisions regarding legal parentage. For
example, in the case of KM. v. E.G., 13 it was decided that the birth mother
was the only legal mother because her partner. the genetic mother, bad
13

13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 136, 146 (Cal. App. 1 Dist 2004)
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relinquished rights to the child through the egg donation process. 14 The
court used the donor consent form signed by the egg donorfmtended
mother and as evidence of having the usual intention of gamete vendors.
This decision, however, was reversed by the California Supreme Court on
the ground that the genetic connection, combined with the egg donor's
intention to rear the children with her partner, was enough to establish
parentage. Her intention put her on a different footing from an anonymous
sperm/egg donor, who would not be held accountable with regard to the
child. 15
A further development-or
twist-in
cases involving gestational
surrogates was the 2003 Maryland case, In re Roberto d. B., both the
gestational surrogate and the intended father, who was also the genetic
father, were petitioning jointly to keep the birth mother's name off the
twins' birth certificate. They argued that since she was neither the genetic
mother nor the intended mother that she should not be on the birth
certificate. Furthermore, it was pointed out that if the lack of a genetic
connection between a man and a child can be used to escape legal
parentage-something
usually done because an intent .ro rear is already
absent-the lac-k of a genetic connection between a woman and a child,
coupled with the lack of intent to rear on the part of the gestational
surrogate, should mean that she is not the legal mother of the child.
The following scenario, however, illustrates a problematic implication
of this rationale. Imagine a woman who agrees to gestate an embryo
created from her husband's sperm and a donor/vendor egg and join him in
rearing a child created in this manner. Suppose that she changes her mind
during pregnancy, because he has cheated on her or because they have
decided to divorc.e. In any case, she no longer intends to rear the child
once it is born and claims that since' she is not genetically connected to the
child, she is not its "real" mother and therefore has no legal (or moral)
obligations toward it. Again, we confront the problem of shifting
intentions and how they are to be incorporated into determinations about
the relationship between particular adults and children in a world where
such significance is attached to genetic connections. It is also reasonably
clear that the offspring in such cases are probably the ones with the most
to lose, even if they are not the only losers in such cases.

14

Sherry P. Colb, When Sex Counts: Making Babies and Making Law (New York:
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2007), 70-71.
15
Colb, When Sex Counts.
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The Root of the Confusion
There are at least two primary contributors to inconsistent attitudes
regarding the relative importance of genetic connections and intentions
discussed above. Other deeply entrenched beliefs may also contribute to
inconsistent attitudes, but the emphasis on individual autonomy, which
manifests in the claim that there is a right to procreate, and the widespread
acceptance of genetic determinism appear to be dominant forces driving us
into the whirlwind of inconsistencies.
There is a widespread assumption that individuals have a right to
procreate-i.e.,
a right to create genetically related offspring. This
assumption has been incorporated into documents such the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which states that "men and women of full
age, without any limjtation due to race, nationality, or religion have the
-right to marry and found a family" (Article 16). Although some argue that
a right to procreate is a fundamental right, 16 others ground this right in
other more basic rights, e.g., the right of self-determination or a right to
privacy. Arguably, a right to privacy is itself grounded in a right of selfdetermination, so I will focus mainly on the notion of a right to procreate
mat is grounded in individual autonomy. For example, John Robertson,
one of the few people who argues for a right to procreate, instead of
merely assuming there is such a right, defines "procreative liberty" as "a
right to reproduce or not in the genetic sense, which includes rearing or
not, as intended by the parents .. .indud[ing] femaJe gestation, whether or
not there is a genetic connection to the chiJd." 17 He also describes
procreation as central to "personal identity, meaning and dignity.'' 18
Hence, Robertson's account of "procreative liberty'' is grounded iD
individual autonomy.
People's reluctance to question whether individuals have a right to
procreate is unsurprising, given our scandalous history of morally
bankrupt efforts to regulate people's procreative activities (e.g., 20 th
century eugenics programs in the United States, Germany, and the United
Kingdom). Many, including Robertson, view the right to procreate as a
prima facie right and assert that the burden of proof is on those who would

16
See, e.g., John Lawrence HilJ, ''What Does it Mean to Be a Parem?The Claims
of BioJogyas the Basis for Parental Rights," New York Universiry Law Review 66
(1991): 353-420.
17
John A. Robertson,Children of Choice (New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

1994). 23.
18

Robertson,Children of Choice, 30.
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deny that there is a right to procreate. 19 However, despite the fact that
societies have gone horribly wrong in past attempts to regulate
procreation, the contemporary view that the primary consideration in the
context of procreation should be the interests or desires of those who are
anempting to procreate, fails to consider adequately the interests of those
who are brought into existence by such actions.
Those who defend a right 10 procreate seem to confuse a right to
engage in consensual sexual intercourse or collaborative attempts to
procreate with a right to achieve certain results. Though individuals may
have a right to cooperate with others in various ways, it does not follow
from such a right that those individuals have a right to any particular
consequences of those actions or a right to impact those who are not
voluntary participants in the collaboration. The fact that there may be a
right to attempt to procreate, which amounts to a right to have consensual
sex or to collaborate with other Willing parties in an attempt to procreate
using assisted reproductive technologies without the interference of others.
does not imply a right to bring another person into existence. To use
Millum's barbershop quartet analogy,20 one's right to form such a group
with others does not entail a right to inflict our talent on an unwilling third
party, much less bring a child into existence so that we will have an
audience.
Whether there is a genuine right to procreate remains controversial,
and whether a coherent account of a right to procreate can be developed
remains to be seen. ln addition to the general problems related to asserting
a right to procreate, there is also the problem of asserting a right to
something that might be impossible to obtain. Onora O'Neill, for example,
bas noted this problem with asserting a right to health, which is distinct
from claiming that there is a right to an environment that provides the
opportunity for normal health (e.g., right to clean water, basic
l 9 I have argued elsewhere that Robertson's account of procreative liberty is
defective and so do not provide a detailed analysis of his position here. See Yvette
Pearson, "Storks. Cabbage Patches, and the Right to Procreate,'· Journal of
Bioethical Inquiry 4, no. 2 (2007): p. I 05-1 15.
20
In response to an earlier version of this paper. wherein I denied the existence of
a negative right to procreate, Joseph Millum pointed out that a person has a
(negative) right to form a barber shop quartet with other willing parties and
implied that there was no distinction between the negative right of two or more
consenting parties to procreate and the right of four consenting individuals to fonn
a barbershop quartel While I agree that individuals have a right to engage in
consensual sex or attempt to procreate through the use of assisted reproductive
technologies, I do not think it follows that they have a right to the possible
outcome of such actions-i.e., a genetically related child.
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nourishment, etc.). There are many unfortunate cases where providing
bealth-maximizing conditions will fail to result in a healthy individual. As
O'Neill puts it, "since it will never be possible to guarantee health for all,
mere can be no obligation so to do ... tbere can therefore be no right to
health. "22 Likewise it is problematic to assert that there is a right to create
genetically related offspring or to acquire a child through adoption, goals
that might be out of reach for some, even in the absence of morally
problematic barriers such as the eugenic sterilization laws of the past.
In addition to the deeply entrenched assumption of a right to procreate,
another pervasive assumption that contributes to · the confused state of
affairs regarding the relative importance of genetic connections and
intentions in the context of procreation, is the assumption of genetic
determinism (or genetic essentialism), which is the view that everything
about us-our physical traits, personality, career choices, hobbies, etc-is
reducible to our genotype. James Watson, for example, claimed that "we
used to think our fate was in the stars. Now we know, in large measure,
23
our fate is in our genes. "
Many others have echoed this sentiment in
their discussions of genetic testing, cloning, genetic engineering,
preirnplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), or other issues related to
procreation. On one level people seem to understand that procreation is a
gamble and that the outcome of rearing a child is no less a mystery, but the
overwhelming preference to procreate with one's own genetic material,
even when strenuous effort is required, suggests that individuals believe
that there is something more valuable or more predictable about using
their own genetic material and rearing genetic progeny than, say, adopting
an existing child.
This widespread embrace of genetic determinism has contrihuted to the
importance placed on ensuring that there is a genetic connection to the
children with whom one has established, or intends to establish, a parentchild relationship. The commitment to creating genetically related
offspring has fostered the growth of a profitable assisted reproductive
technology industry that has helped many circumvent their infertility and
realize the goal of bringing genetically related children into the world.
honically, however, this has led to the creation of children whose
"generational continuity" is compromised (i.e., by the use of gametes from
21

Onora O'Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2002).
22
Onora O'Neill, Auronomy and Trust in Bioethics, 79.
23
Robert N. Proctor, "Resisting Reductionism from the Human Genome Project,"
in Classic Works in Medical Ethics, ed. Gregory Pence (New York: McGraw-Hill,

1998), 342.
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anonymous donors/vendors) by the procreators' quest to guarantee the
same "generational continuity" for at least one of the prospective parents.
Here we see a tension between the emphasis on individual autonomy and
the embrace of genetic determinism. Moreover, we see a shift from
valuing actual genetic connections between parents and offspring to
valuing the mere appearance of genetic connections. We know only that
people value genetic connections, not why, and people's reasons for
valuing the veneer of genetic connections are even more mysterious.
As the preceding discussion suggests, the emphasis on individual
autonomy eclipses other relevant considerations, such as the welfare or
other interests (e.g., in "generational continuity") of the offspring. The
focus on rights-or supposed rights-and interests or desires of ·adults
dominates not only reproductive decision making but also decisions about
who has parental obligations or entitlements toward children. How a
particular adult values genetic connections to others will impact whether
she will attempt to create a genetically related child, pursue a relationship
with genetic progeny (e.g., created through anonymous gamete
donation/sale or unintentionally), or continue or break f>ffan established
parent-child relationship. The interests of children, particularly when
decisions whether to procreate are being made, are viewed as secondary, if
they are considered at all.
Ultimately, it appears that the focus on the rights and interests of adults
bas obscured our view of obligations toward offspring. As a hedge against
this, the focus of procreative decisions, as well as discussions about
procreation, should shift to emphasize obligations toward offspring rather
than the rights and interests of procreators. In addition this shift in
perspective, it is likely that continuing advances in the field of genetics,
coupled with an expanded effort to educate the public, will alter some of
the beliefs and altitudes toward procreation and offspring that are currently
influenced by the prevailing assumption of genetic determinism.

